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Summary findings
As China consolidates its rapid economic gains and  Progress in human resource development has steadily
continues its drive toward a market-oriented  slowed in recent years, however, because of two broad
environment,  the country's international competitiveness  problems. First, the distribution of education services
will depend greatly on the quality of its human  continues to discriminate against the poor, largely
resources.  because they have not benefited from recent gains in
China has made impressive gains in human resource  economic growth  and are being choked off from access
development in the past two decades, and continuing to  to services.
do so will help reduce poverty in two ways: indirectly, by  Second, some mechanisms and arrangements for
increasing the productivity and efficiency of its labor  delivering services have created targeting inefficiencies.
force, and directly, by fostering the earning capacity of  Hossain argues that the government's priorities
the poor. Eventually, improving human resources will  should be to improve the equity, efficiency, and quality
spur economic growth and enhance welfare.  of social services, as well as their financing.
This paper - a product of the Rural and Social Development Division, China and Mongolia Department - is a revised
version of chapter  1 of the World Bank report "China: Social Sector Expenditure Review, 1996," China and Mongolia
Department, Washington, D.C.,  1996.  Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW,
Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact Clydina Anbiah, room T7-015,  telephone 202-458-1275,  fax 202-522-1778,
Internet address shossain@worldbank.org. August 1997. (32 pages)
The Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  disseminates  the findings  of work in progress  to encourage  the exchange  of ideas  about
development  issues.  An objective  of the  series  is to get the  findings  out quickly,  even if the  presentations  are  less  than  fully polished.  The
papers  carry  the names  of the authors  and should  be cited  accordingly.  The findings,  interpretations,  and conclusions  expressed  in this
paper  are  entirely  those  of the authors.  They do not necessarily  represent  the view of the World  Bank,  its Executive  Directors,  or the
countries  they  represent.
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INTRODUCTION
The stage is set for China to begin making significant strides in educational
development. First, China's economy  is buoyant,  with a projected annual  growth  rate of
8 to 10 percent over the next twenty  years. As such, additional  resources  should readily
be  available from both public and private sources. Second, demographic profile is
favorable  to the education  sector, in particular, the size of the school-age  population  is
declining,  reflecting  that financial  burden both on the government  and on working adults
will be reduced (Fig 1). Third, shifts in the structure  of the economy-rapid employment
growth in the industrial and service sectors as well as an increase in the number of
workers  with post-primary  education-mean that China's education  sector will assume an
increasingly  prominent  role in the economic  growth. (Table  1, Annex 1).
To take advantage  of these opportunities,  however,  China must confront  major
challenges  at each level of its educational  system.  At the primary level, for example,
only two-thirds  of primary school students  currently  complete  their entire primary cycle,
completion  rates are particularly low among poor regions and female students at the
secondary  level, many families  lack the incentive  to send their children in school, due
largely to  both economic  and cultural factors. And at the higher level, coverage is
extremely  low, and the subsector  has been slow to respond  to the emerging  labor market
demand  inspired  by China's growing  economy. The purpose  of this paper is threefold:  to
assess  the current status  of education  in China  with a regional  perspective,  to examine  the
main challenges,  and to propose strategic  directions for creating an externally  efficient
education  system  that enables  the country  to enter  the 21st century  on a sound footing.
Overall Development
Educational  development  in China has been quite impressive.  The adult literacy
rate, an outcome of past cumulative  investment  in education,  grew from 60 percent in
1960 to  74 percent in  1994. By the early 1960s, China had also achieved virtually
universal enrollment  in primary education, a coverage rate that still outpaces  the rates
found in several  Asian counterparts.  But, China does lag behind  other countries  regarding
other dimensions  of educational  progress.  For instance,  its rate of enrollment particularly
in higher education  is below both the average among all Asian countries and the rates
found in low-income  countries,  let alone its close comparators.  Key outcome  indicators,
such as average  grade attainment  of the current school-age  population  and cohort survival
rate,  although showing steady progress, are  modest when compared with those of
Malaysia, Korea, Thailand and Sri Lanka (Table 2,  Annex 1). For  instance, average
grade attainment  is 5.6 years in China, which is close only to India but significantly
lower than its close comparators. Likewise, cohort survival rate is 68 percent, quite
lower  than its close  comparators  and similar  only to the Philippines.
Yet, when income level is accounted  for, the level of educational  attainment  in
China is moderately  high relative  to other countries  (Fig 2) . Part of the difference  can be
explained  by how the three levels of education--primary,  secondary  and tertiary-- areFi-ure  1
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affected by budgetary  allocations,  private-public  sector demand, and level of economic
development  in China. Thus, the pace of improvements  in qualitative  indicators  in China
would depend on the  choice of  investments and sectoral policies, especially those
affecting  the development  of primary  and secondary  education  in needy areas. There may
be little scope for improving quantity but there is room for quality enhancement  in
schooling, which may infact generate more significant  gains in educational  attainment.
Evidence  from several developing  countries  suggest  that the rate of return to improving
the quality of schooling  is high compared  to improving  quantity  of schooling  of a given
quality  1.
Access  to Education  and Equity  within  the system
(a)  Access  to Education.  Gross enrollment  rates at the primary level had been
higher overtime,  but the enrollment  growth compared  to other levels is slow because  the
coverage  at this level was already extensive  for a long time (Fig 3). Slower growth in
enrollment  in primary education  also stems  from declines  in birth rates since 1970s  and a
reduction in dropout and repetation  rates that reduced the proportion  of students in the
primary school-age  range.  In secondary  level, gross enrollment  rates rose progressively
but at the higher level, both enrollment  rates and growth remained  low based on the
overall experience  among  Asian countries  (Table 1, Annex 1). Although  populist  policies
during the Great Leap Forward period created greater higher educational  opportunities
for working  class and peasants, femine  and social  conflict  in the early 1960s  thwarted  that
momentum,  and all universities  were closed in the early 1970s in favor of several short-
2 term training  courses. Regular  enrollments  were restored  in 1976, but China had already
lagged behind Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and other Asian countries in  terms of age
cohort participation  rates in higher education.  Moreover,  the urban focussed  short-cycle
courses in vocational  universities, supported by municipal  governments  became more
popular than provincial universities' 4-year academic programs that typically lead to
prefecture  and county  level  jobs.
(b)  Structural Equity:  In  Table  1,  the  data  show the  shape of  the
enrollment pyramid which reflects the  access to  various levels of  education and
determines the distribution of educational  attainment of a generation.  While public
expenditure  by  level of education is  another structural dimension of equity as  it
influences  the distribution  of resources in the sector. But, structural equity alone does
not necessarily imply that people from all socio-economic  backgrounds and from all
geographic regions have  equal access to  schooling.  Therefore, accessibility to
education and educational achievements  by  different income groups and across all
provinces  are examined  on the basis of both time-series  and survey data later.
For empirical evidence in a number of countries see, Jere Behrman and Nancy Birdsall,"The Quality of Schooling: Quantity
Alone is Misleading" American Economic Review,  1983. Jere behrman, Donald Ross and Richard Sabot,  "Inproving the Quality
Versus Increasing Quantity of Schooling" 1992, Colby College (Mimeo), Waterville, MA
2 Higher education was perceived very inegalitarian, creating an exclusive elite group. See Julia Kwong,"Chinese
Education in Transition: Prelude to the Cultural Revolution" Montreal: McGill Queens University Press, 1979.Figure  3
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At  least three important characteristics  have shaped a  structurally equitable
educational system in China; a flatter enrollment pyramid--nearly  universal entry into
primary education  and lower enrollments  in higher education; and, more instructive, a
pattern  of  government  spending by  educational level  that  conforms  equitable
distribution of  resources. From  1982 to  1993, more  than 60  percent of  public
educational spending was allocated to basic education--primary  and junior secondary
levels--so that the poor can get wider access to it. Another feature, although not yet
very significant, is the growing private enrollments  in higher education, suggesting  that
the  proportion of  fees being used to  finance post-primary levels of  education is
increasing,  allowing  greater subsidies  to basic education.Table  1: Structure  of Enrollment  and Public  Expenditure  on Education
1980  1985  1993
Gross enrollment  ratio (percentage)
Primary  148.0  126.0  104.0
Secondary  32.0  39.0  48.0
1.1  1.6  2.0
Higher
Public expenditure  on education
As a percentage  of GNP
Primary  0.95  0.79  0.75
Secondary  1.00  0.79  0.74
Higher  0.55  0.58  0.51
As a percentage  of public  expenditure
Primary  3.4  3.6  4.7
Secondary  3.6  3.5  4.3
Higher  1.9  2.8  3.1
As a percentage  of education  expenditure
Primary  38  36  40
Secondary  40  36  39
Higher  22  27  21
Percentage  of cumulative  public  spending  29  27
received  by best educated  decile a/
a/ Staff estimates
Source: State  Education  Commission  and SSB.
A single summary indicator of structural equity is provided by the share of
cumulative  public expenditure  received by the best educated decile in a generation.
Overall, 10 percent get 27 percent of cohort resources and 90 percent receives the
balance, reflecting an egalitarian distribution of public subsidy in education. This is
also well below the regional Asian average  of 39 percent. Normally, the best educated
decile in developing  countries  receives  more than its population  share of the cumulative
public expenditure on education. The cutoff at 10 percent is an arbitrary one, but it-6  -
provides an indicator of the  concentration of public resources on  education. 3 The
relative extent of structural  equity is captured  by a Lorenz curve and the corresponding
gini concentration ratio (fig 4). The Lorenz curve for China is close to the line of
equality and the gini coefficient  is quite low (0.39). It is useful to note that the gini
coefficient is  smaller than it was in  1985 (0.43), reflecting that the distribution of
public spending  on education  has become  much more equitable  in the past seven  years.
Table  2: Gross  Enrollment  Rates by Quintile  of Provincial  Per Capita  Income
1993
Age group  of children
7-11  years  old  12-14  years  old  14 and  above
Quintile  Male  Female  Total  Male  Female  Total  Male  Female  Total
I  90.2  83.2  86.7  28.5  24.0  26.2  3.8  1.9  2.8
II  92.0  90.3  91.1  38.1  33.0  35.5  5.2  2.3  3.7
m  93.1  91.0  92.0  39.2  37.1  76.3  6.8  3.0  4.9
IV  95.1  94.8  94.9  66.3  71.4  68.8  7.9  3.3  5.6
V  97.6  97.2  97.4  72.9  78.6  75.8  9.2  3.8  6.5
Rural  92.3  87.6  90.1  34.8  31.0  32.9
Urban  96.8  96.6  96.7  70.2  75.0  72.5
Source:  Staff  estimates  from SSB  and State  Education  Commission  data.
This trend owes much to the increasing  enrollments  in private universities and
introduction  of user fees in public  higher education.  However,  the differences  in the rates
of cost recovery and unit costs within higher education  are not captured  here. But, it is
very unlikely  that a more sophisticated  calculation  would  reverse  the finding  that Chinese
system of education is fairly egalitarian in its global structure of access and public
expenditure.
Yet, the structural equity has not translated into equitable  educational  benefits
across provinces. While primary education  are relatively targeted to poor provinces,
accessibility  to  post-primary  education shows marked interprovincial  variance. When
provinces  are ranked  by per capita income  from poor to rich, the avowed  policy of the
government  to ensure an egalitarian  distribution  of educational  expenditure  increasingly
vanishes  (Fig 5).  Per-pupil  expenditures  are disproportionately  higher in rich provinces
compared to  those in  poor provinces.  The richest quintile of provinces Shanghai,
3 Cumulative  public  spending  on education  refers  to the total amount  of public  resources  appropriated  to a
generation  of people  passing  through  their schooling  years. It captures  the distribution  of cumulative  benefits
(education)  among  people  with  different  school  careers, rather than  the distribution  of single  period  benefits  at a
given level of education.  For details  on calculation,  see Alain  Mingat  and Jee-Peng  Tan,"  On Equity  in Education
Again:  An International  Comparison"  Journal  of Human  Resources,  no 2, 1985Figure  5
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Beijing,  Tianjin, Guangdong  and Liaoning  spent  almost 1.5 times more than the poorest
provinces  such as Guizhou,  Guangxi,  or Henan.
Table  3  Drop out Rates by Area and by Gender,  1992
Rural  Urban
Grade  Male  Female  Total  Male  Female  Total
Primary
level
1  37.8  31.9  33.8  21.7  42.1  31.0
2  21.1  22.7  22.2  8.7  10.5  9.5
3  17.4  21.4  20.1  43.5  15.8  31.0
4  13.4  13.5  13.4  17.4  21.1  19.0
5  9.4  8.6  8.8  8.7  5.3  7.1
6  1.0  1.9  1.6  0.0  5.3  5.3
Secondary
level
7  29.5  33.4  31.8  23.5  22.5  23.1
8  55.1  53.7  54.3  47.1  65.0  53.7
9  15.4  12.9  13.9  29.4  12.5  23.1
Source:  SSB: Situation  of Children, 1992.
(c)  Access to education  by provinces. The foregoing  is substantiated  by the
differences  in enrollment  rates for primary,  secondary  and higher education  by quintile  of
provinces  in Table 2. The attendance  rates at the primary level are, by and large, similar
irrespective  of poor or rich area, confirming  the earlier observation  from national  data of
universal  entry at this level of education.  But the enrollment-rate  disparity  between rich
and poor provinces grows as students move on to  secondary  and higher levels. Such
disparity is  particularly acute among the  12-14 and  14  and  older  age  groups--
corresponding  to post-primary  education--than  among  the 7-11 age group.  Urban-rural
differentials  are also pronounced,  and this can be attributable  to differences  in income  and
quality. Primary education  that corresponds  to age range 7-11 is compulsory  in China,
but attendance is not universal in rural area particularly among the females. Urban
children  and those  from high-income  provinces  are much more likely  to attend secondary
school  (about  2.2 times)  compared  to children  from rural area and low-income  provinces.
In the absence  of compulsion  in the subsequent  age groups the gap in attendance  rates
widens steadily. Higher education  is mostly received  by households  in richer provinces.-8  -
What has happened to the access to  education  by provinces in other years? Similar
household  surveys are not available, but enrollment  rates by provinces, ranked by per
capita income  from poor to rich, indicate  that the importance  of income as a correlate of
school  enrollment  has not changed,  the richer the province  the higher the enrollment  rate
in post-primary  education.
(d) Social selectivity. Chinese  educational  system  suffers  from social selectivity.
Disparities in drop-out rates at the secondary education  level are quite pronounced .
Male-female differences in  primary education are  modest but  very  significant in
secondary  education.  Drop-out rates also widely vary according to geographic  location
and level of education:  high in poor provinces  and secondary  education,  and vice versa.
In secondary  education,  in rural areas, more females  tend to drop out of school than do
males (Table 3). The reason is that due to obvious economic  difficulties,  females from
poor families  leave  the schools  earlier to start working at home or to help their families.
Inadequate  learning  environment  in poorer provinces  is another  reason for early exit from
school system.
(e)  Affordablity  and Quality.  Private costs incurred by the poor are high
enough to prevent them from attending  schools. The main components  of out-of-pocket
educational  expenditure  are tuition, textbooks, stationaries  and contribution  to schools
(Table 9, Annex 1). The figure 6 shows that as a percentage of non-food household
expenditure, the poorest quintile spend three times more on education  (14.2%) than
those in the top quintile  (5.5%). The full private  cost of school  attendance  would raise the
cost-nonfood  expenditure  ratio--a  measure of affordability--further  if the opportunity  cost
of time in school  is considered.  For rural area, total private educational  expenditures  are
examined  by provinces, ranked by per capita income from poor to rich (Fig 7), and
similar conclusion  holds--that  the prices faced by families in poorest rural provinces are
high enough to create an obstacle  to raising enrollment  rates than those in the wealthy
provinces. Infact, figure 8 shows  that economic  conditions  prevent nearly 40 percent of
children among the 7-14 age group, corresponding  to primary and junior secondary
education, from attending  schools in the poorest province (quintile I) compared to  14
percent in  the  wealthiest province (quintile V).  Moreover, regarding quality of
schooling, one direct measure of the quality gap is the availability  of textbooks  and
teaching materials  in schools. The same data confirm that more than 35 percent of the
children  living in the poorest provinces  reported either inadequate  supplies  of textbooks
or other teaching materials  as the main reason for not attending  schools; corresponding
figure for children in the richest province  is 21 percent.  In higher education, a simple
regression with province-level  data show that graduation rates are influenced by theChina:  Affordability  of Public  Schooling
Urban  Area
Figure  6
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availability  of qualified  faculty. But the poor provinces  are deprived of more qualified
faculty. Based on relative faculty ratio (RFR) the richest quintile of provinces--Beijing,
Shanghai, Zhejiang, Liaoning clearly have an oversupply of professor and assistant
professor, as the value of RFR far exceeds  one (1.60 and 1.20); conversely,  the poorest
quintile  of provinces--Guizhou,  Xinjiang,  Anhui, Henan, Guangxi  and Sichuan  --have an
undersupply  of  such  more qualified  faculty  (Table 12, Annex 1).
Outcomes  and Efficiency
This section focuses on outcomes  that are internal to the educational  system--
specifically,  cohort survival  rates and transition  rates, and outcomes  that are external to
the system, such as private and social rates of return to educational  investments.  Both sets
of outcomes  are critical, since together  they help determine  the global efficiency  of the
educational  system. Yet, few efforts are made to assess the impact of public policy on
these outcomes  in China. The dearth  of such assessments  is due in part to the scarcity  of
appropriate data and in part to  the fact that these outcomes were not important to
policymakers  under the command  economy.
(a) Internal  efficiency.  Conventionally,  an  education system is  internally
efficient  if it generates  the maximum  output at minimum  cost. Outputs  are measured  by
such indicators  as transition  rates and cohort survival rates or the proportion  of students
who start grade 1 and complete  each subsequent  cycle, students' cognitive  and technical
skills, scientific  knowledge,  improved and the like. Ideally,  a combination  of individual
survey and time-series  data are used for this analysis. However, in the context of the
present study, readily compiled provincial-level  time-series  data are used to provide
results that would be helpfuil  for policy interventions  for improving system's internal
efficiency  which also improves  quality.
At the aggregate level, educational  outcomes vary directly with income. The
transition  rates from primary to secondary  and secondary  to higher level of education  are
higher in higher income provinces  us compared  with those in lower income provinces.
Other eclectic statistical  analysis strengthen  the conclusion  that public expenditures  are
important  determinants  of transition  from one level to another. A regression  is done in
which transition rates are explained on the basis of per capita income, per student
educational  expenditure  and agricultural  wages. Agricultural  wages are used to measure
the opportunity  cost of children's' time and to the extend possible  the expected  value of
education.  The results clearly suggest  that both income  and educational  spending  tend to
increase  transition  rates (Table  4). But more importantly,  the results indicate  that keeping
budgetary  allocation  to primary education  at a high enough level will compensate  for the
negative effect of low income by making the likelihood  of transition  to secondary  and
higher levels of schooling  more equal  throughout  the country.- 10-
The transition  from junior to senior secondary  education  is negatively  associated
with the transition  from primary to secondary  levels. This reflects that some of the less
qualified  students  from the high-income  provinces  where transition  rates are high, fail to
survive  the next level or perhaps  they go out to work with families  or in the labor market
due to higher opportunity  costs. This is reflected  by the opposite  signs of income and
education  expenditure  variables  and higher negative  value of agricultural  wage  variable in
equation  (2). Primary education  is compulsory  and supply-driven,  while at post-primary
levels,  the household  choice  for extending  education  can be predicated  on the opportunity
costs to parents of pupils' time. Transition  rates to secondary  education  are low in poor
and more agricultural  provinces  than in rich provinces  that are less agricultural. Thus,
equity and better educational outcomes well justify public expenditure at  primary
education.
It is also important  to assess if low transition  rates to secondary  schooling  are a
concomitant of poor  schooling conditions in  primary education or  of  weak private
demand for secondary education.  Empirical evidence in several countries suggest that
schooling conditions in  primary education is  critical because they create learning
environment  for students  and motivate  them to continue  education  at post-primary  levels.
The regression  results in Table 4 suggest  that the demand for post-primary  education  is
not weak, as transition  rate is positively  associated  with per capita household  income--a
measure of the strength of private demand.  Moreover,  mean achievement  test score--an
indicator of the quality of education--is  strongly associated  with higher transition rates.
Thus, improving  the quality  of primary  schools--an  outcome  that can be influenced  by the
government budgetary decisions--would  enhance continuation of  education to  post-
primary levels.
Another  piece of evidence  is the differences  in cohort survival  rates at the end of
primary school  by provinces.  Higher cohort survival  rates are associated  with lower per-
pupil costs in wealthy  provinces  relative  to low-income  provinces,  reflecting  that the rich
provinces have  more  internally efficient educational systems than  their  poorer
counterparts. Students in high-income  provinces including Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin,
Guangdong and Liaoning survive until the  end of primary cycle. While in poorer
provinces like Guizhou, Guangxi or Anhui about 20 to 25 percent of students do not
persist  to the end of primary cycle. (Fig 9)Fig.  9
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Table 4  Regression Results  for  Transition Rate, 1992
Dependent
Variable =  Transition rate, 1992
Primary  Junior Secondary
Right hand  to  to
side variables  Secondary  Senior Secondary
constant  -86.4*  -0.17
(-9.23)  (-0.77)
log Income per capita  12.91*  -0.571*
(2.02)  (-2.49)
log Expenditure per pupil  10.33*  -0.077
(3.05)  (-0.56)
log Agricultural income  1.69  -0.106
(0.95)  (-1.74)
Deviation of Grade 6 Achievement Score  0.112*  -NA-
From National Mean  (2.55)
N  29  29
Adj. R  0.655  0.305
Note:  The T-statistics are in parenthesis.
(*)  Significant at 5 % level.
(b)  External  Efficiency.  Ascertaining a closer match between the education system's
future output and the demand for educated labor requires rate of return analysis. Such
analysis also  assesses  whether  educational investment had  any  impact on  household
welfare,  and where should resources be allocated in the sector so as to  make it more
externally efficient? A summary of economic rates of return to three levels of education,
based on "elaborate" or "complete" method with the data from 1993 Labor Survey by the
Ministry of Labor, is presented in Table 5. Both the private and social returns  to each
level of education were high in 1993, making investments in education socially profitable
in China.- 12 -
The social rates of return is the highest  for primary education  (14.4%), followed
by secondary  education  (12.9%), implying  that investment  in these levels of schooling
will promote both equity and efficiency  objectives.  These findings are consistent with
those elsewhere  that additional  years of primary education  will increase  productivity  and
income among  the poor 4.  In secondary  and higher education,  the social rates of return
are not very high due partly to higher  government  subsidy  in terms of increased  operating
budget and  teachers' salaries. This is  also reflected in  the  index of  subsidization
particularly  for higher education,  which indicates  the degree  to which  costs are borne out
by the public  sector compared  to the private sector. In China, the index is only 4 percent
for secondary  education  and 31 percent for higher education  . The high private returns to
secondary  and higher education  imply that investment  in these levels lead to high wage-
paying  jobs, an important  paradigm in a rapidly growing economy  such as China. But,
high  wages may also  reflect institutional pressures (minimum wages) rather than
augmented productivity resulting from human capital formation by  these levels of
education'.
Table  5: Rates of Return  to Education  (Percent),  1993
Private  Social  Index of
Rate of Return  Rate of Return  Subsidization
(a)
Primary  18.0  14.4  1.25
Secondary  13.4  12.9  1.04
Higher  15.1  11.3  1.31
Note: see Technical  Annex A for detail
(a) The ratio of private  to social  rates of return.
Source: Staff calculations  from MOL Survey 1993
Table 6 reports the basic Mincerian  earnings functions,  showing  that the overall
marginal  private rate of return to one year of extra schooling,  irrespective  of education
level, is around 12.5 percent. The marginal returns to education for three levels of
education  are displayed in the last column. These rates are consistent with the earlier
4See  for example, Lockheed, Jamison and Lau,  1980,"Farmer Education and Farm Efficiency: A Survey in Education and
Income" World Bank Staff Working Paper No 402. Authors found that on average, farmers with four years or more of primary
education were at least 7 percent more productive than those with no primary schooling.
5 Labor productivity improved slowly until 1987. See I.J. Singh,"Industrial productivity in Socialist Economies",  1991.- 13  -
findings  as they are close to those based on the  "complete" method in Table 5.  One
exception to findings found in other developing countries is the positive coefficient on the
squared term for schooling (S2). Thus,  contrary to the common pattern of diminishing
returns to spending in additional years of schooling, there is slightly increasing return in
China.  The results  perhaps  reflect the  changing economy in  which  large  agricultural
sector is utilizing labor inputs of mostly less educated workers, and  a rapidly growing
modern sector that is demanding more highly educated and qualified labor.
Overall,  three important conclusions emerge from  foregoing analysis. First,  the
high social rates of return to primary and secondary education suggest that the demand
for  labor with these educational levels still exists.  The government may allocate more
resources  to  these  levels  of  education  in  order  produce  more  graduates,  but  such
allocations should be selective at the secondary level; since costs vary  significantly by
fields of study, as does the demand. Second, the social rate of return to higher education
investments is below the  returns to  investment in alternative forms  of capital,  casting
doubt  whether  further  public  expenditures  in  this  subsector  are  justifiable.  But  if
externalities are considered then social ROR to tertiary education would be much higher
than the quoted social ROR and reducing expenditures may jeopardize the already very
narrow access to higher education, particularly among the poor. The attendance rates in
higher education are very low, capturing only one fifth of secondary school graduates.
The students who exit from education system create an oversupply of labor with senior
secondary schooling, thereby affecting their wages and eventually dampening returns on
investment. It would be prudent to target governmental resources to those fields of study
where the demand in labor market is high. Third, the access to higher education should
be  enhanced by  introducing alternate methods of financing higher education,  such  as
scholarships and student loans that eventually would help reduce the differences in rates
of return.- 14 -
Table  6: Returns  to Education  (Mincenan  Earning  Function),  1993
Rate of
Return
Basic  Dummry  (Percent)
constant  10.12  12.03
Schooling(s)  12.20
Schooling (S2)  0.005
squared
Experience (E)  0.031  0.034
Experience squared (E2)  -0.0002  -0.0001
No education (Base)  0.000
Primary  0.303  18.2
Secondary  0.517  13.6
University  1.488  18.9
R2  0.274  0.268
Note: See Technical Annex  A for detail.
Source: Staff calculations from MOL survey 1993.
Finally, one important issue concerning the social rate of return is that it is based
on monetary earnings (or productivity) and excludes any "externalities" associated with
education.  These are benefits of education that go beyond what the individual investor
realizes in terms of increasing earnings, such as effects on others by having more literate
people around, or better nourished and health children if a mother is educated.  However,
this  is not really  a critique of the rate of return analysis.  It  is a possible addition  to
education benefits  that  are  unmeasured,  as  for  any  other  investment in  a  country.6.
Assessing  education  system's  future  output  goals  also  need  tracking  labor  market
development that are not captured by the ROR analysis. Table  13 (Annex 1) presents
some relevant market signals,  such as job  vacancy rates by educational qualification .
From 1990 to 1995, while the demand for all types of labor has increased, but the growth
in  the demand  for  secondary and university  graduates is  particularly  high,  justifying
expansion of these subsectors.
6For recent attempts to quantify education externalities, see P. Romer,  "Increasing Returns and Long Run Growth" Journal of




China's  demographic and economic conditions appear remarkably conducive to
future  educational development,  and preceding  analyses reinforce  the justification  for
further  investments and  policy changes in  basic education--primary and  secondary  --
mainly  to  improve  its  capacity  to  enroll  and  retain  poor  students  in  economically
disadvantaged areas, and in higher education mainly for diversifying its structure in tune
with labor market signals . As such, the following strategies deserve urgent attention.
Basic  Education:  One  emerging  problem  that  may  become  critical  in  the
education system is its weak capacity to retain students in primary and secondary levels.
Significant selection occurs within cycles of education through dropping out in  several
poor  provinces, particularly  among the girls.  This  results in  adverse selectivity in the
sector.  To prevent the emergence of a disenfranchised social underclass, fundamentally
policies should aim to lower the private costs by reforming prices, and raise the private
benefits by fostering quality of education.  Most of the costs are determined by public
expenditure policies---the volume of recurrent subsidies determines how much individuals
are asked to pay, and investment expenditures determine the density of school placement.
The benefit side is influenced by how much the government spends on subsidizing such
inputs as training for teachers, textbooks, equipment and classroom supplies.
Pricing Refonns:  To reduce the private cost of education for the poor children the
government should adopt pricing reform.  Lessons of three successful measures can be
adopted to  increase  affordability depending on  area  and  household  characteristics in
China. First,  elimination of tuition and fees, second,  introduction of voucher, covering
fees plus costs related to school attendance, and third, introduction of augmented subsidy
that covers fees, related costs for school attendance plus opportunity costs foregone. The
third  measure  will improve enrollment prospects  among the poor  the  most.  In  Asia,
augmented  subsidy was  first  introduced  in  Sri  Lanka  by  the  government,  and  later
became popular in other countries.  Recently, through World Bank projects, such subsidy
has been introduced in Bangladesh and Guatemala for girls  only,  while vouchers were
introduced in Colombia and Pakistan.  In each project,  students must maintain a certain
grade average to continue to receive both subsidy and voucher. Another step involves
food for education in primary and secondary schools only for the poor children as done in
Bangladesh. So far,  these measures have proved successful at enhancing enrollment and- 16 -
retention  rates among  poor as well  as female  students?. Since  disparity  in enrollment  and
survival in basic education  occurs across region, gender and ethnic minority, the means
of targeting above  subsidies  should  be based  on geographic  region that is the so-called  8-
7 poverty  counties,  gender  and ethnic  minority.
Improving  Quality: To increase  the private benefits  of basic  education  among  the
poor its quality must be improved. One indication  of quality  gap is the variation across
income levels in the amount of private spending  on public schooling,  much of which is
devoted to such quality-enhancing  inputs as textbooks.  Given our regression analysis
finding  that government  expenditure  tends  to improve  survival  prospects  among students
the central government  should seek to allocate  more resources for teachers' training,
textbooks  and other classroom  materials  in poorer areas.  In this respect, schools should
be targeted, because high dropouts, repetition and low achievement  scores are more
prevalent  in poorer regions, serving  low-income  households.
Special Measures:  The government should also consider relocating schools
closer to communities,  changing the content of curricula, and recruiting  more female
teachers from local community to  augment girls' participation  and enable them to
continue  successive  grades in a particular  education  cycle. Cross-country  evidence of a
strong  and positive  association  between  girls' enrollment  and female  teachers  are abound,
and evidence  for China will be available  when  Bank-  financed  projects  are completed. 8
Secondary  Education:  Enrollment  and survival  rates in secondary  education  are lower
in China than in other Asian countries  at similar  income  levels. Our analysis  suggest  that
this is mainly due to the lack of demand  stemming  from cultural factors  rather than the
lack of spaces. But the dynamics  of China's new labor market should increase  demand
for secondary  school  graduates,  necessitating  some  forms of governmental  interventions.
Although the present policy of  9-year compulsory  education that extends the junior
secondary level  does  enhance coverage, yet  additional intervention via  financial
incentives  for school  attendance  covering  direct and foregone  earnings  particularly  in less
developed  areas would be needed with the caveat that this incentive  could be reversed
when further  justification  no longer applies 9. Currently, the underlying assumption  for
such intervention  is not inconsistent  with the empirical  findings  of transition  rates from
primary to junior secondary  education. But empirical support for higher government
subsidy for senior secondary  education to promote attendance  and stimulate survival
prospects  is apparently  weak. However,  this conclusion  does not nullify  the case for more
narrowly targeted subsidy and financial incentives  such as scholarships  for poor but
meritorious  students  in senior  secondary  education.
7See,  Shaikh I. Hossain, "Education Finance: Public Private Interface" (mimeo), Paper Presented at the National
Institute of Educational Policy, New Delhi, India,  1995
8G.  Psacharopoulos and H.A.  Tzannatos 1992, "Case Studies on Women's Employment and Pay in Latin America"
Regional and Sectoral Study, World Bank, Washington D.C
9Malaysia  and Sri Lanka incorporated reversibility in their compensation design. The specific circumstances justifying their
initial introduction did not continue when attendance and cohort survival rates improved markedly.- 17 -
Higher Education:  In higher education  the transition from the existing highly
elite system catering only 2 percent of the age cohort to a mass system has been slow
relative  to its several  East Asian  comparators,  and the system  is projected  to cover only 5
percent of the age cohort in 200010. Although  social  rate of return from higher education
is low, yet future demand  in China's expanding  labor market argues for finding ways to
enable  universities  to expand  current enrollments.  Once  the demand  for secondary  school
graduates  rises, which is a likely  prospect  in itself, this pool will be enlarged  from which
only an expanded  tertiary
Adequate.  but not excessive  vocational:  and technical  education.
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education can absorb the intake. Moreover, the current ease and speed with which
graduates  find jobs and the brain drain of skilled  people from the interior to coastal  belt
could create a wide gap in the skills  required  by the expanding  labor market; in turn, this
gap could reduce the country's attractiveness  to foreign investment  in medium  and high
technology  areas, undermine  institutional  capacity,  and fuel income inequality  when the
labor market becomes  more liberalized  in the future.  The following  broad measures
should  be considered.
Diversyfv  structure. Ensuring  a more diverse, inclusive  population  of prospective
students  and responding  to the new dynamics  of China's rapidly evolving  labor market
demand  calls for three specific  measures:  moving  toward a multiversity  system,  recasting
and expanding  the menu of courses, and providing  flexible  regulations  governing  how the
private education  system  operates.
The 1993  reform document  envisions  some form of multiversity  system,  but the
main question  now is how rapidly and by what processes  the transition  to a multiversity
system can be made. One option would be to merge several currently underutilized
campuses and facilities and then upgrade the lower-level  institutions. All universities
including those in the coastal belt should be encouraged  to expand their student base,
opening  them up to more nonresidential  students.  These arrangements  would raise pupil-
faculty ratios, thus lowering the equality gap  between the higher and lower-level
institutions.  By way of illustration,  a simulation  based on regression  analysis  and data on
size distribution  show that these equality-enhancing  measures  would  yield savings of
more than 20 percent of the current operating  costs of  institutions  with an enrollments  of
2,000 students" 1. One other option  would  be to create more distance  learning  institutions
(open universities ) that would be accessible  to  adults, disabled, and geographically
dispersed students.  Of course, the standards  of these long distance, open systems  would
have to be regulated  carefully  by the SEdC to ensure  that their graduates  can productively
perform in the labor market.
The second element  of structural  diversification  would entail expanding  menu of
courses and recasting them with greater applicability  to and inclusiveness  in the new
labor market. Such courses  would include  new approaches  to engineering,  management,
finance  and economics,  whose enrollment  rates have risen sharply  since 1980 and whose
applicability  to professional  employment  has become  more focused. Traditional  subjects
such as history and literature  could be broadened to include new interdisciplinary  and
applied fields of study. With SEdC as the central oversight  body, universities  can form
panels of teachers, scholars, and employers  from public and private sectors to make the
academic  market  more adaptive  to the labor  market. The content  and form of the courses
11  For  corroborative evidence see also W. Min, (1990),"Chinese Higher Education: Mode of Expansion and Economies of
Scale" Jiaoyo Yanjiu , October, Beijing.- 20 -
should be reviewed on a regular basis and modified as feedback from the panel and
institutions  warrants.
The third element  of diversification  would  be to expand  the private sector in order to
promote competition.  Equity considerations,  a weak  legal framework  and the absence of
quality control have  inhibited the  expansion of  private  higher education.  1 2 The
government  should encourage  healthy growth by adopting  a binary policy: regulations
that control quality and quantity  and incentives that complement  these.  Regulations on
entry  conditions, input-output mixes, teaching technology, and  student enrollment
qualifications through national examinations are  advisable. But,  strict  restrictions
particularly  those  that mimic the requirements  applied  to public  institutions,  may hamper
the private sector from operating  efficiently  and limit its ability to expand educational
options for a  diverse population of  students in  a  rapidly evolving labor market.
Accreditation  on a differentiated  scale of academic  excellence  should  continue, and could
well become the sole public policy tool, much as it has in OECD and many Asian
countries, when private education  matures. This policy will provide incentives  to both
private and public institutions  to regulate  themselves,  as well as encourage  consumers  to
make intelligent  choices  about institutions.  To mitigate  against  lax quality standards,  the
government  should  consider  establishing  an independent  national  oversight  committee  to
review the consistency  of accrediting  standards periodically.  Incentives to promote the
growth  of private education  may include  tax advantages  and grants. The government  may
exempt private institutions  from paying income tax on their tuition revenues, related
services,  portfolio  income and donation. But it must first pass legislation  that defines  the
conditions not only for tax exemption  but also for the access to preferential foreign
exchange,  credit or land grants.  Selective  grants for R&D can be provided when public
institutions  lack that facility  and expertise.
Irnroving Quality: Faculty development  is pivotal to improving  the quality of
higher education. The main problem  is the paucity  of qualified  faculty  in poor provinces.
The government's commendable  steps to upgrade the quality of faculty by improving
remuneration,  enhancing  training, and adopting  preferential  housing and social welfare
policies, have had  little impact. Hence, the  government should adopt a  policy of
deploying well-qualified  teachers in poorer provinces, complemented  with ongoing in-
service  training  that promotes  a more inclusive  grasp of subject  matter and more effective
pedagogical  practices.  Indeed, evidence  from several countries  shows that teachers' in-
service training  has a positive impact  on student  achievement.1 3 To increase  the number
of highly qualified  teachers,  the faculty  positions  should be made competitive  with other
industrial  jobs, primarily  by raising salary levels and  expanding  benefit packages. The
government  should also consider  granting scholarships  for overseas  studies and training,
providing greater rewards for academic excellence, and encouraging part-time jobs.
Raising qualification  or introducing  teachers' examinations  for specific fields of study
may be required as the ability  of entering  students  changes.
12 See Wu Zhongkui, "Overview of Current Chinese Private Schools"  Chinese Education Journal, no 3 (1994).
13  Marlaine E.  Lockheed ed,  1993 "Effective Schools In Developing Countries"  London: Falmer Press.- 21 -
Selective Increase in User fees.  Private tuition and fee contribute only 5 percent
to total recurrent university expenditures, and in recent years cost-of-living subsidies have
captured  20  percent  of  total  public  higher  education spending.  Both  areas  could  be
improved by reducing the burden of subsidization on the public sector. Given the high
private  rate  of  returns  to  higher  education,  government  subsidy  may  limit  private
spending that students and their parents want to make. Indeed, there are two indications
that the private  sector is able  and willing to  pay: the existence of excess demand for
education i.e more applicants than available places, and donations.  Rising enrollments
reflect  that  increasing user  fees selectively would  not  reduce  the demand  for  higher
education but  instead allow government to mobilize private contributions for expanding
access and thus improving equity. However,  setting tuition and fees according to costs
per student, rather than in absolute amount would be desirable so that charges could be
raised in accordance with inflation. The government should further reduce subsidies for
the cost of living that students would incur whether or not they are enrolled. These non-
instructional subsidies are still high relative to many Asian comparators and should not be
a substitute for private spending that could be made anyway by many households.  Such
step can significantly alleviate crowding-out problem, freeing-up government resources
for expanding enrollments in other levels of education.
Student  Finance Schemes.  The foregoing indicates that high subsidies and low
user fees in public higher education tantamount to a blanket scholarship and student loan
schemes that support a limited part of the entire system, which not only creates adverse
impact on equity but also thwarts the efficacy of public expenditure. As discussed below
such outcomes can be redressed by  reconfiguring the existing mechanisms for  student
finance.  It  is  clear  that  priority  fields  of  study  will  be  offered  mostly  in  public
universities. But in future private (Minban) universities will continue to grow not only in
response to increasing demand but also as a result of limited places in public universities.
In such situation, there will be more pressure to expand the access to public universities.
But given the high unit cost in public relative to private universities, such expansion may
cause further inefficiency and greater social selectivity because the better-off students will
get more opportunities who would otherwise have gone to private institutions.
Scholarship  scheme  targeted  to  poor  and  qualified  students  can  avoid  such
perverse  outcomes. Although such scheme is already in place in  China,  such as poor
rural students provide national services instead of paying tuition and fees;  yet, public
universities are still guaranteed a captive clientele and thus insulated from the competitive
pressures  of  having  to  justify  the  quality  and  cost-effectiveness of  their  educational
services to users and comrnmunities.  So scholarships should be untied students should be
allowed to select institution of their choice, public or private. Thus spurring competition
and  promoting  efficiency.  The  student loan schemes are  also  available  in  37  public
universities. However, to avoid re-emergence of blanket subsidy and higher default rates
in future, loans should be given only to students who do not qualify for scholarships but
who cannot fund studies from their own sources. Repayment programs should be made- 22 -
into income-contingent  payment systems where loans are repaid according to the post-
graduate  earnings  of the borrower' 4.
Finally, although  ample scope  exits for cost savings  and revenues  from the sales
of  services to  SOEs, donations, too  much dependence on  these  sources may be
counterproductive.  Experience shows that the advantage  in these cases may diminish
beyond a revenue recovery  rate of 15 percent, and educational  institutions  may turn into
profit-making organizations. Evidence shows that in  several OECD countries these
sources  do not contribute  more than 10 percent  of total university  revenues' 5. University-
run enterprises  played an important  role in income  generation  and may continue  to do so.
But institutions  should  undertake investments  on the basis of comparative  advantage  and
the demand  for their products,  sale and marketing  of new  technologies.
Concluding  Remarks
As China consolidates  the momentum  of its rapid economic  gains and drives  more openly
into the market environment, the quality of human resources will be an important
determinant  of the country's competitiveness.  China  has made impressive  gains in human
resource  development  in the past two decades,  and continuing  its strides will help redress
poverty, both indirectly  by increasing  the productivity  and efficiency  of its labor force
and directly by fostering the earning capacity of the poor.  Eventually an enhanced
human  resources will spur economic  growth and welfare. Yet, its progress has slowed
steadily  in recent years, mainly  because  of two broad  problems. First, the distribution  of
educational services  continues  to discriminate  against  the poor, largely  because  they  have
not benefited  from the recent gains in economic  growth and are being choked off from
service access.  Second, some current mechanisms and arrangements for devolving
services have created targeting inefficiencies.  As  such,  this paper argues that the
government's  priorities are to enhance  financing  and improve the equity, efficiency  and
quality  of  social  services
14 In countries  where  credit  culture  and discipline  within  the student  population  is relatively  weak,  early  preparation  for income-
contingent  deferred  payment  scheme  is better. Such schemes  have led to low default  rates in Tunisia, Australia,  Sweden,  and
Quebec  Province  of Canada.
15 For evidence  see  OECD, "Financing  Higher  Education"  Paris,  OECD 1990.- 23 -
ANNEX 1
Table  1: School  Age Dependency  Ratios and  Employment  Trends
Projected
1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2010  2020
A.  Dependency
Ratio a/
Male  48  47  44  37
Female  47  46  43  35
B. Employment By Sector
(Percentage)
Agricultu  74  60  59  53  46
re
Industry  14  22  21  23  25
Service  12  18  20  24  29
C. Employment By Educational
Qualification (Mil)
Primary  72  92b  35C





Primary  5.0  -6.1
Post-  17.1  0.6
primary
aSchool-age population (5-19) relative to  population aged 20 and above.
b1992.
c1993.
Base,  UNESCO.- 24 -
Table  2:  Overall  Indicators  of Educational  Development,  1993
Public  Cohort
Expenditure  in  Gross  Enrollment  Ratio  Grade  Survival
Education  as a  (Percent)  Attendance  Rate 
Percentage  of:
GNP  Public  Primay  Secondary  Higher  (Year)  M Spending  Prmr  Seodr  Hihr  (e)  (%
Bangladesh  1.9  11.3  59  18  5  4.0  25
Bhutan  3.8  8.6  31  5  0.1  1.6  16
China  2.0  12.1  104  51  2  5.6  68
India  3.3  13.9  99  41  10  5.2  39
Indonesia  3.6  14.8  119  48  9  7.5  61
Korea  3.4  16.7  105  87  38  11.8  97
Lao PDR  9.6  9.5  110  27  2  4.9  41
Malaysia  7.4  18.5  102  58  7  9.5  97
Mongolia  5.3  11.8  82  50  15  6.5  80
Myanmar  2.1  11.0  103  24  6  6.8  NA
Nepal  1.6  10.4  86  31  5  3.7  35
Pakistan  2.8
Philippines  1.8  13.2  101  70  28  9.4  67
Papua  New Guinea  7.0  15.3  72  14  3  4.5  67
Sri Lanka  3.2  10.7  107  71  6  10.0  87
Thailand  3.9  16.6  87  28  16  7.2  83
Viet Nam  1.3  5.6  105  40  5  7.1  60
Mean  3.6  12.6  93.1  41  10  6.4  60.2
a/  End of primary level.
Source:  World Bank Data Base, unesco- 25 -
Table 3: Enrollment Rates By Level of Education
Year  Primary  Secondary  Higher
1980  148  34  1.3
1985  118  39  1.7
1990  107  47  1.9
1995  104  50  2.2
Source: World Bank Data Base.
Table 4 : Public Expenditure on Education, 1983-93
(billion yuan)
Current Drices  1987 Prices  As a percentage  Qt
Public
Year  Recurrent  Capital  Total  Recurrent  Capital  Total  GNP  expenditure
1983  10.38  2.41  12.79  8.03  1.87  9.90  2.2  9.9
1984  11.66  3.16  14.82  9.49  2.57  12.06  2.1  9.6
1985  14.02  4.38  18.40  12.66  3.96  16.62  2.1  10.0
1986  22.47  4.00  26.47  21.26  3.78  25.04  2.7  11.4
1987  24.21  3.56  27.77  24.21  3.56  27.77  2.5  11.3
1988  24.58  3.43  28.01  21.95  3.06  25.01  2.0  10.3
1989  24.68  3.64  28.32  20.06  2.96  23.02  1.8  9.3
1990  27.79  3.41  31.19  21.05  2.58  23.63  1.8  9.0
1991  30.17  3.47  33.64  21.44  2.47  23.91  1.7  8.8
1992  36.19  4.00  40.19  24.58  2.72  27.30  1.7  9.2
1993  55.11  4.48  59.60  38.27  3.11  41.39  2.0  12.1
Average  25.57  3.63  29.20  20.27  2.97  23.24  2.0  10.1
Annual average
growth (%)a  12.4  10.6  12.2  4.7  3.0  4.5
Note: Includes central and local government expenditures.
aoLSQ growth rate.
Source: State Education Commission and Staff Estimate- 26 -
Table 5:  Sources of Financing Total Education
(Percentage)
Sources  1991  1992  1993
Government Budget  68.4  67.2  65.7
Education Levy  10.1  10.5  9.4
Tuition & Fees  4.8  5.1  8.2
School Enterprise  5.4  5.4  6.1
Community Fund Raising  8.6  8.8  6.6
Other  2.7  3.0  4.0
Source: SEdC
Table 6: Public Expenditure on Education by Category
(Billion Yuan  Percentage
Non-  Non-
Personnel  Personnel  Personnel Personnel
1990  24845  10807  69.7  30.3
1991  27100  11770  69.7  30.3
1992  33889  12515  73.0  27.0
1993  39951  11911  77.0  23.0
Source: SEdC- 27 -
Table 7 : Public Expenditure by Level of Education
-Current Prices (bil Yuan)-  ----(Percentage)-----
Year  Primary  Secondary  Higher  Primary  Secondary  Higher
1984  4.23  4.2  3.27  36.2  35.9  27.9
1985  5.26  5.21  4.02  36.3  36.0  27.7
1986  6.11  6.05  4.69  36.3  35.9  27.8
1987  8.03  7.75  6.06  36.8  35.5  27.7
1988  8.13  7.06  6.15  38.1  33.1  28.8
1989  10.30  9.53  8.46  36.4  33.7  29.9
1990  11.77  10.58  8.84  37.7  33.9  28.3
1991  12.64  11.35  9.63  37.6  33.8  28.6
1992  15.42  13.69  11.06  38.4  34.1  27.5
1993  21.33  20.03  18.22  35.8  33.6  30.6
Source: SEdC
Table  8:  Expenditure on Education By Level of Government
(Percentage)
Year  Central  Locala  Total
1987  12.9  87.1  100
1988  14.1  85.9  100
1989  13.0  87.0  100
1990  13.7  86.3  100
1991  12.9  87.1  100
1992  13.2  86.8  100
1993  12.8  82.2  100
aLocal  Government Provincial  + County  + Municipality
Source: SEdC- 28 -
Table 9:  Urban Area:  Affordablity of Public Education: Private Educational Expenditure
By Quintile, 1992
(As a percentage of Non-food Expenditure)
Poorest  Richest
Item  I  II  III  IV  V  China
Textbook  1.28  1.02  0.89  0.73  0.52  0.81
Tuition
Basic  8.47  6.98  5.91  4.55  3.34  5.24
Secondary  1.22  1.14  0.91  0.81  0.57  0.83
Higher  0.53  0.41  0.51  0.65  3.61  0.56
Stationaries  0.61  0.63  0.53  0.43  0.29  0.45
Othersa  0.49  0.44  0.63  0.31  0.28  0.41
Total  14.24  10.52  9.34  7.41  5.56  8.21
Education
aAllowance, Contributions
Source: SSB: Urban Household Survey, 1992
Table 10:  Rural Area:  Affordablity of Public Education: Private Expenditure By Quintile
of Province, 1992
(As a percentage of Non-food  Expenditure)
Quintile of  Education  Health
Province
Poorest  I  19.0  15.1
II  15.6  14.0
III  18.2  14.6
IV  16.7  12.3
Richest V  14.4  11.5
Source: SSB: Rural Household Survey, 1992- 29 -
Table 11: Quality of Basic Education: Reasons For Not Attending Schools, 1992
(Proportion of Children aged 7-14)
Econo-  Poor  Lack of  Disabled  Other  Average
mic  Condition  Text
book
Quintile
I  38.2  14.2  35.8  3.3  8.5  28.5
II  41.5  18.7  24.3  3.2  12.3  18.0
III  24.3  18.3  37.5  5.8  13.5  29.7
IV  25.8  22.5  30.0  5.1  16.4  16.2
V  13.5  16.0  21.2  13.8  13.6  12.8
Source:  SSB: Situation  Of Children  1992
Table  12: Quality  of Higher  Education:  Relative  Faculty  Ratio  (RFR),  1993
(By Quintile  of Province)
Faculty  I  II  III  IV  V
Professor  0.66  0.61  0.84  0.83  1.61
Asst Prof  1.04  0.88  0.87  0.97  1.20
Lecturer  1.12  3.12  1.20  1.09  0.99
Assistant  0.92  1.29  1.07  0.92  0.88
RFR:  (Provincial  Faculty/Provincial  Students)/(National  Faculty/National
Students)  in Higher  Education.  RFR exceeding  one  indicates  oversupply  and  less
than one  indicates  undersupply  of faculty.
Source: Staff Estimates From SEdC data.
Table 13:  Vacancies by Educational Qualification ('000)
1990  1995
Primary  24.5  21.0
Secondary  31.2  38.3
University  06.1  12.4
Source:  MOL- 30 -
CALCULATION OF THE RATE OF RETURN TO INVESTMENTS IN EDUCATION
Two main methods for estimating rate of return to investments in education
were considered, namely (a)  Elaborate method and (b) earning function method.  The
following sections illustrate these methods.
(a)  Elaborate Method:  Following Psacharopolous (1973, 1985), the basic
equation for this method is given by,
N
E  (YH-YS  )t (I + r)
t-l
= ~(Ys)t(lJ+r)t -,,  (1)
Where, Y = labor earnings, H = higher education, S = secondary education and r = rate of
return which is obtained by solving the above equation.  The estimated rates of return for
1988 showed in the text were derived from an iterative computer program that begins with
an arbitrary value of r  and keeps modifying it by small increments until the left-hand side
equalizes the right-hand side.  For private rate of return, the only cost of education under
evaluation is the opportunity cost of staying on in school beyond the age 18 instead of
working in the labor market.  Conventionally, this opportunity cost is measured by the
earnings of labor with secondary school qualifications. For social rate of return, public unit
costs of education are included in the right-hand side of equation (1).
In this respect, the earnings should be before-tax, whereas in the private rate
of return, earnings should be net of tax. But, as Psacharopolous (1985) points out, the post
versus pre-tax treatment  of  earnings does not  make  any  significant difference in  the
calculation of the rate of return.  It is the added cost (unit costs) of schooling that chiefly
explains the difference between these two rates of return. As a result, a social rate of return
remains lower than a private rate of return.
The earningfiunction method: The earning function starts with a regression
equation of the following form:
(2)
Where Y is income and S is the level of schooling. This semilog equation is an inflexible
functional form.  The implication is one of increasing returns to education, unless second-
order regressors are included. The parameters of a semilog equation are:
(3)- 31 -
If b is constant, as Y increases aY/aS also increases.  This imposes an inflexibility on the
coefficients, which can be resolved by incorporating a higher-order terms in the regression
equation. (3)
In tune with equation (3) the Mincerian model specifies a relation of the form
InY=a + 3S+0 2 EX+3  3 EX2 (4)
where Y is income, S is schooling, E is experience and S x E is the schooling-experience
interaction variable.  As noted before, this function as the disadvantage of being inflexible
but, if squared terms are included, the inflexibility is largely overcome.
The estimated regression coefficient b is interpreted as the average private rate of return to
one extra year of schooling. Mincer also proved that
aInY a  Y as
i.e., the rate of return is nothing but the relative change in earnings (alnY) as a result of a
change in schooling (aS).  It is more appealing if one adds an educational level dimension
to this average rate of return. The first way is to add an e.s2 term in equation (4) where e is
the estimated coefficient on years of schooling squared. A differentiation with respect to S
yields
r=  1+2eS  (5)
By substituting different values of S in the RHS of equation (5), a regression-derived rate of
return  corresponding to  different  levels  of  schooling can  be  computed.  Thus,  for
elementary education (S=6), secondary education (S=12) and higher education (S=16) can
be assigned. Another way is to specify different levels in the earnings function by means of
a series of dummy variables (as reported in Table 6), viz. ELEM, SEC and HIGH having a
value of 1 if the person belongs to the particular educational level and 0 else:
InY = a + 1 I ELEM +  E32SEC+  3 IHIGH  + 04 EX + 5 EX2  (6)
From this equation, the return to different levels of education are derived from the estimated
coefficients
T (Elementaryvs.  illiterate)  =  _
SE
t(Secondaryvs.elementary)=  032 1
Ss-SE
T  (Highervs. secondary)  =  3  2
SH-Ss- 32 -
Where,  SE = elementary schooling
Ss  = secondary schooling
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